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Abstract 
The primary objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on 
how financial statements audited by Big-Six auditors convey better 
information than those audited by non-Big Six auditors to two groups 
of users: security analysts and investors. Earnings forecast errors, the 
dispersion of earnings forecasts, and the magnitude of earnings 
response coefficients are used as surrogates for the quality of financial 
statement information. 
Security analysts significantly improve their accuracy and reach a 
higher degree of consensus in their earnings forecasts after firms switch 
their auditors from non-Big Six to Big Six accounting firms, compared 
to switches within the same class (i.e., from a Big Six [non-Big Six] to a 
different Big Six [non-Big Six]). Around the auditor switching years, the 
magnitude of earnings response coefficients also increases significantly 
for firms which switch their auditors from a non-Big Six to a Big Six 
firm, compared to those which switch their auditors within the same 
class. Overall, Big Six auditors seem to provide higher audit quality of 
financial statements, which is consistent with premises adopted by 
previous studies. 
Key Words: audit quality, earnings forecast errors, the dispersion of 
earnings forecasts, earnings response coefficients, financial statements, 
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1. Introduction 
External auditing is widely viewed as a device to restrict the 
self-serving behaviour of managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Ng, 1978; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Dopuch and Simunic 
(1982) indicate that users of financial statements evaluate the 
credibility of external auditors, since highly credible auditing is 
likely to reduce the probability to successfully conceal the self- 
serving behaviour of management. In a similar vein, DeAngelo 
(1981) argues that the ex ante value of audits to shareholders 
and creditors depends on how these users perceive biases 
underlying financial statements and how auditors truthfully 
report their findings. Since users of financial statements do not 
have access to corporate financial records, they need to develop 
surrogate measures to assess the reliability of the financial 
statements under review. One such measure is the size or 
reputation of an auditor retained by the firm. For example, audit 
opinions of Big Six auditors are likely to be seen a s  more 
credible than those of non-Big Six auditors.') If product 
differentiation exists between audits of Big Six and non-Big Six 
firms, an audit switch between these two classes will result in 
changes in the perceived quality of financial statements. As a 
result, accounting earnings information communicated through 
financial statements audited by Big Six (non-Big Six) auditors 
might be more (less) useful to users in their investment 
decisions. 
After DeAngelo (1981) and Dopuch and Simunic (1982), the 
so-called product differentiation hypothesis has been widely 
recognized in auditing (Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Ettredge, 
Shane, and Smith, 1988). Up-to-date, however, no systematic 
empirical research has been conducted to support that financial 
statements audited by Big-Six auditors indeed communicate 
higher quality financial information. Thus, this paper empirically 
tes ts  for possible differences in the quality of financial 
statements audited by Big Six versus non-Big Six auditors, by 
1) There are now only four big auditors in the USA as Price Waterhouse was 
merged with Coopers & Lybrand and Ernst & Young was mergerd with 
KPMG in 1997. 
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documenting the behaviour of two different user groups: 
security analysts (sophisticated users) and investors (general 
market participants). Specifically, this  study investigates 
whether there are significant changes (improvements or 
degradations) in (1) analysts' earnings forecast errors and the 
dispersion of earnings forecasts and (2) the earnings-returns 
relationship for firms that switch their auditors. 
The empirical results present that security analysts are able to 
issue better earnings forecasts, a s  well a s  reach greater 
consensus in their earnings forecasts, a s  firms switch their 
auditors from a non-Big Six to a Big Six firm, compared to 
switches within the same class (i.e., from a Big Six [non-Big Six] 
to a different Big Six [non-Big Six] firm). Accordingly, analysts 
seem to better appreciate financial statements audited by Big 
Six audi tors .  Also the  magnitude of earnings  response 
coefficients increases significantly after an auditor switch for 
firms that switch their auditors from a non-Big Six to a Big Six 
firm. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as  follows: Section 
Two discusses the development of research hypotheses; Section 
Three describes measurements of variables and methodologies; 
Section Four presents sampling procedures; Section Five reports 
empirical results; and Section Six concludes the paper. 
2. Hypotheses Development 
Audit quality is evaluated by documenting how well the 
audited financial statements assist two user groups-security 
analysts and investors. Security analysts are considered a s  
"information intermediaries" who process and provide financial 
information for third parties. As indicated by Arnold and Moizer 
(1984), analysts are an efficient information user group, since 
they specialize in one market sector and spend most of their 
time analyzing financial information that  is continuously 
released to capital markets. Investors have been also considered 
as  one of the most important groups that are able to evaluate 
the quality of financial statements. Thus, this study investigates 
how financial statements audited by those who have different 
levels of credibility affect the above-mentioned two typical user 
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groups in making their investment-related decisions. 
The theoretical model of Dopuch and Simunic (1982) depicts 
how external audits are demanded when there is information 
asymmetry between management and investors about the 
integrity of management. In this setting, attestation by a credible 
auditor may serve one of two functions: ( 1 )  to signal 
management integrity to investors or (2) to restrict the ability of 
less scrupulous management to conceal, through misrepresen- 
tation in financial statements, the consequences of its self- 
serving decisions. 
Many researchers have attempted to explain why there is an 
increasing trend of auditor switching from smaller to larger audit 
firms. Research findings can be divided into two general groups. 
One group of studies indicates that  Big Six auditors (BIG 
hereafter) have advantages in performing audits less expensively 
t han  non-Big Six auditors (NONBIG hereafter) due to 
specialization (Danos and Eichenseher, 1982; Schwartz and 
Menon, 1985; Simunic and Stein, 1986). The other group of 
studies focuses on the concept of auditor credibility. Credibility 
must be associated with observable characteristics, such as  
auditor reputation, since the details of audits are not publicly 
available. Audit firms are not equal in terms of their credibility 
(reputation or audit quality) that evolves over a long period of 
time. Moreover, there are diverse opportunities and motivations 
for management in selecting their auditors. Thus, the market for 
auditing should be characterised by product differentiation. 
Dopuch and Simunic (1982) present a so-called product- 
differentiation hypothesis in which large auditors are perceived 
a s  prohding audits of higher quality than those of small 
auditors. 
DeAngelo (1981) also argues the existence of a positive 
relationship between the size of audit firms and their audit 
quality, but from a different angle. She assumes that if auditors 
are suspected of cheating clients in carrying out their regular 
audit work, they are less likely to be retained by other existing 
clients, thereby compromising future audit fees. If audit firms 
earn client-specific quasi-rents, larger auditors (earning more 
aggregate quasi-rents from more clients) have greater incentive 
not to cheat, when compared to smaller auditors. Consequently, 
the audits of larger auditors will be of higher quality. 
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2.1 Audit Quality and Analyst Earnings Forecasts 
Financial analysts (i.e., information intermediaries) are 
considered a s  one important group tha t  builds the  pre- 
disclosure information environment. The superiority of analysts 
in predicting accounting earnings over univariate time-series 
models is attributed to their abilities to reflect contemporaneous 
information on a timely basis (Brown, Griffin, Hagerman, and 
Zmijewski, 1987). 
Analysts have incentives to be precise since their professional 
credentials are dependent upon their accurate predictions of 
accounting earnings. Managers, on the other hand, have a 
substantial degree of discretion in measuring earnings within 
the boundary of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). This discretion is in part ascribed to the loose link 
between what a firm reports in its financial statements and what 
it actually earns. Thus, analysts need to collect and process 
private information in addition to publicly available information 
in order to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. 
As publicly available information becomes more reliable, 
approximating more closely what is expected to be measured, 
analysts might find less need to rely on their own private 
information. Furthermore, less demand for private information 
would result in a higher consensus of earnings forecasts 
because analysts would share a more common information base 
in issuing their earnings forecasts. 
The dispersion of earnings forecasts has been attributed to 
heterogeneous beliefs among analysts about future earnings 
(Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift, 1991; Atiase and Bamber, 1994). 
Chung, Kim, and Lee (1997) show that analysts are able to 
reduce the dispersion of earnings forecasts, as well as earnings 
forecast errors, over the forecast horizon as  the date of earnings 
announcement draws closer. Chung, Kim, and Lee (1997) 
indicate that analysts can reduce the uncertainty of a firm's 
economic performance over the forecast horizon a s  more 
financial information is gradually disseminated to capital 
markets from alternative  source^.^) An increase in the quantity 
2) However, they document that analysts cannot predict the uncertainty of 
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of high-quality public information induces security analysts to 
share more common bases of information in issuing their 
earnings forecasts. 
Suppose that the quality of financial statements is judged 
based on analysts' capability to closely reflect a firm's economic 
value by minimizing measurement biases that are induced for 
non-accounting reasons. Then, high-quality financial statements 
would be a n  output of accounting systems that  assure a 
systematic transformation from what a firm economically earns 
to what it reports in its financial statements. 
Craswell, Francis, and Taylor (1995) provide evidence, using 
Australian publicly listed frms, that Big 6 (now big 4) auditors 
earn more (around 30% more) than Non-Big 6 auditors; brand 
name reputations are thought to be better for Big Six auditors. 
Menon and Williams (1991) document that  clients and 
investment bankers prefer Big Six auditors at the time of public 
offering to signal firm commitment. To avoid reputation 
deterioration (which should be more costly for Big Six auditors) 
and loss of greater audit fees received, Big Six auditors may 
spend more time in their auditing processes, thus  offering 
higher quality financial statements. As a result, financial 
statements audited by BIG would provide less uncertainty to 
analysts in issuing their earnings forecasts than NONBIG. 
This study tests the differential audit-quality hypothesis by 
examining whether an audit switch has any systematic impact 
on the accuracy and dispersion of analysts' earnings forecast 
errors.3) If product differentiation exists, one might expect to 
observe smaller forecast errors and smaller dispersion of 
analysts' earnings forecasts for firms which switch auditors from 
NONBIG to BIG, ceteris paribus4), compared to switches within 
earnings management effectively. 
3) There is a positive correlation between the dispersion of earnings forecasts 
and earnings forecast errors (Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia, 1995; 
Chung, Kim, and Lee, 1997). 
4) Alternatively, other studies explain earnings forecast errors as intentional 
biases (e.g., optimistic forecasts) induced by analysts.. Analysts need to 
cultivate good relationships with the firms the analysts follow. There are 
several reasons why security analysts need to maintain good relationships 
with managers of firms followed. (See Affleck-Graves, David, and 
Mendenhall, 1990 and McNichols and O'Brien. 1996.) For example, 
managers are the primary information source for security analysts in 
updating their earnings forecasts, and the brokerage firm for which security 
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the same class. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hl,: Compared to switches within the same class, the forecast 
errors and dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts in 
the period that follows an auditor switch from NONBIG to 
BIG are equal to those in the period preceding the switch. 
Hl,: Compared to switches within the same class, the forecast 
errors and dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts in 
the period that follows an auditor switch from NONBIG to 
BIG are smaller than those in the period preceding the 
c witch.^) 
2.2 Audit Quality and Stock Market Reaction 
Prior empirical studies have provided evidence that accounting 
earnings is related to the value of a firm's equity securities (Ball 
and Brown, 1968). This empirical relationship is based on the 
assumption that current earnings serve as a relevant proxy for 
expected future earnings, which in turn helps predict future 
cash flows accruing to shareholders' interests (Beaver, 1989). 
Earlier studies assume that stock prices respond uniformly to a 
given level of unexpected earnings. However, some recent studies 
provide evidence that there are considerable cross-sectional 
variations in the earnings-return relationship. Factors which 
affect the cross-sectional variations include (1 )  fundamental 
characteristics of a firm's earnings-generating process, such as 
earnings persistence (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987) and risk and 
growth (Collins and Kothari, 1989; Easton and Zmijewski, 
1989), (2) information environment (i.e., firm size, Atiase, 1985), 
analysts are working earns its revenue by providing investment banking 
services to those firms followed by its security analysts. Therefore, it is not 
easy to divide earnings forecast errors into intentional biases and prediction 
errors. Thus, this paper assumes that analysts do not change the amount of 
their intentional bias, if there is any, around the year in which an audit 
switch is made. 
5) The preliminary examination of the 1995 Compustat Primary, 
Supplementary, and Tertiary (hereafter, P-S-T) tape shows that there are 
only six usable sample firms that switch their auditors from BIG to NONBIG 
auditors. Accordingly, the primary investigation of this study will focus on 
firms that switch their auditors from NONBIG to BIG. 
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and (3) the quality of earnings (Lev, 1989). 
This paper proposes that differences in auditor credibility 
affect the quality of earnings; thus,  the earnings-returns 
relationship varies. Accounting earnings numbers audited by 
more (less) credible auditors are more (less) likely to be reliable 
and more (less) likely to reflect a firm's underlying economic 
flows. The differential audit quality hypothesis suggested by 
Dopuch and Simunic (1982) and DeAngelo (198 1) predicts that 
firms which switch their auditors from NONBIG (BIG) to BIG 
(NONBIG) may be considered to acquire improved (deteriorated) 
audit services and to generate more (less) reliable accounting 
information. If a perceived quality differential in external 
auditing exists, one might expect to observe a stronger earnings- 
returns relationship for firms that switch their auditors from 
NONBIG to BIG, ceteris paribus. This leads to the following 
hypotheses. 
H2,: Compared to switches within the same class, the rela- 
tionship between earnings and security returns in the 
period that follows an audit switch from NONBIG to BIG 
is equal to the relationship in the period preceding the 
switch. 
H2,: Compared to switches within the same class, the rela- 
tionship between earnings and security returns in the 
period that follows an audit switch from NONBIG to BIG 
is stronger than that of the period preceding the switch. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Accuracy and Dispersion of Earnings Forecasts 
This paper uses analysts' earnings forecast data compiled on 
I/B/E/S tape. Since earnings forecasts of security analysts are 
considered as a proxy for expected earnings in capital markets, 
the closer earnings forecasts are to earnings announcements, 
the better earnings forecasts serve as a proxy. I/B/E/S issues 
its summary report once a month; thus ,  this paper uses  
earnings forecasts in the I/B/E/S summary tape which are is- 
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sued in the month immediately prior to the date of earnings an- 
nouncement. 
Forecast errors of analysts (FE) are computed a s  actual 
earnings per share (EPS)~) reported by I/B/E/S minus the mean 
of EPS forecasts,"divided by the stock price a t  the date of 
earnings announcement .7) 
where 
Ajt = actual EPS for firm j reported by I/B/E/S for year t, 
qt = the mean of earnings forecasts (issued prior to earnings 
announcements) for firm j, year t, 
and 
5, = stock price for firm j at the date of earnings announce- 
ment for year t. 
The dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts is measured in 
two different ways, consistent with Bamber and Cheon (1995). 
One measurement is the standard deviation (STD) of earnings 
forecasts (deflated by stock prices on the date of earnings 
announcements) issued in the month prior to the date of 
earnings announcements. The other measurement is the range 
(RANGE) between the highest and lowest earnings forecasts 
(deflated by stock prices on the date of announcements) issued 
in the month prior to the date of earnings announcements. 
The first hypothesis examines whether an auditor switch has 
any systematic impact on the accuracy and dispersion of ana- 
lysts' earnings forecasts. To test this hypothesis, the paper 
compares the dispersion of earnings forecasts and earnings 
forecast errors of the pre-switch period (one or two years before 
the audit switch) to those of the post-switch period (one or two 
6) Philbrick and Ricks (1991) report that when I/B/E/S forecasts of EPS are 
used, prediction errors based on actual EPS reported by I/B/E/S are 
smaller than those based on actual EPS reported by COMPUSTAT. 
7) The magnitude of forecast errors could be affected by the difference in 
earnings capitalization ratios in the cross-sectional study. Thus,  
alternatively, earnings forecast errors are computed by using actual EPS as 
a deflator. Since, however, there is no substantial difference in results 
between the two deflators, this paper reports empirical results based on 
stock price as a deflator. 
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years after the audit switch). The year of auditor switch is 
excluded from analyses since the  switching year will be 
influenced by both old and new auditors. The first hypothesis 
can be tested as  follows. 
H11,: IFEIpostj- IFEIprej = 0 
H11,: I FE I - I FE l ,rej < 0,  for firm j,  which changes its 
auditor NONBIG to BIG, 
and/or 
H12,: STD(O~RANGE),~~~~ - STD(O~RANGE),, = 0 
H12,: STD(O~RANGE),,~,~ - STD(O~RANGE),,~ < 0, for firm j 
which changes its auditor from NONBIG to BIG, 
where 
I FElprej and I FEIpostj = absolute values of earnings  
forecast errors for firm j in the 
pre- and post-switch periods, 
respectively, 
STDprej and STDpostj = standard deviations of earnings 
forecasts for firm j in the pre- 
and  post-switch periods, 
respectively, and 
RANGEPrej and RANGEPostj = ranges between the highest and 
lowest earnings forecasts for 
firm j in  the  pre- and  post- 
switch periods, respectively. 
All variables, FE, STD, and RANGE, are deflated by a stock 
price a t  the  date of earnings announcement and are also 
computed over one-year a s  well a s  two-year observation 
windows. Over the one-year observation window, FE, STD, and 
RANGE are computed for year - 1 (year +1) around the year of 
audit switch for FE,,, STD,,, and RANGE,, WEpost, STDpost, and 
RANGEpost). These three variables are re-estimated by computing 
means of FEs, STDs, and RANGES over years - 1 and -2 (years +1 
and +2) for FEpre, STD,, and RANGE,, (FE,,,,, STDpost and 
RANGEpSd for the two-year observation window. 
It is possible that the magnitude of analysts' earnings forecast 
errors and/or the dispersion of earnings forecasts might be 
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induced by some systematic changes in firm attributes, such as  
firm size, growth, and/or the number of security analysts 
following the firm's progress. Prior studies indicate that firm size 
and/or growth are significantly associated with auditor choice 
(Healy and Lys, 1986; Johnson and Lys, 1986; Palmrose, 1986; 
Simunic and Stein, 1986; and Francis and Wilson, 1988). while 
the accuracy and dispersion of earnings forecasts are affected by 
firm size and the number of security analysts following the firm 
(Brown, Richardson, and Swager, 1987; Dempsey, 1989; Chung, 
Kim, and Lee, 1997). 
In addition, a change in firm growth could affect the accuracy 
and dispersion of earnings forecasts because of changes in the 
information environment. A firm's growth (GRW) is measured as  
a percentage change in sales growth, while the natural log of a 
firm's market value is adopted as a proxy for firm size (SIZE).*) 
Therefore, multiple regression models are developed by including 
these moderating variables as follows. 
and 
ASTD(or RANGE),., = + c1Djt + %AGRWjt + c3ASIZEj, 
+ c4AN0 + wj, (3) 
where 
A l FE I ,., = changes in I FE l j, from the pre- to the 
post-switch period for firm j, year t, in 
which an auditor switch is madeg) 
= I FE l posyt - I FE 1 pre jt, 
ASTDjt = changes in STD from the pre- to the 
post-switch period for firm j, year t 
= STDpostjt - STDpre jt? 
ARANGq, = changes in RANGE from the pre- to the 
post-switch period for firm j, year t 
= RANGEpostjt -RANGEp, jt? 
Djt = a dummy variable which has the value 
8) In addition, proxies for growth and size are measured based on total assets, 
but there is no substantial change in results. 
9) The change in I FE I is employed to avoid the sign effect. 
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of 1 if firm j switches its auditor from a 
NONBIG auditor to a BIG auditor in  
year t; for other types of switches, this 
variable takes the value of 0, 
AGRW,, = changes in GRW from the pre- to the 
post-switch period for firm j, year t 
= GRWpostjt - GRWpre jt* 
ASIZqt = changes in SIZE from the pre- to the 
post-switch period for firm j, year t 
= (SIZE,,tjt -SIZE,re jJ /SIZE,re jt, 
ANojt = changes  in  t h e  number  of security 
analysts following the firm from the 
pre- to the post-switch period for firm j, 
year t, 
= (NOpostjt - jd /NOprejt* 
bo, b,, b,, b3, b4 and 
co, c,, q, c,, c4 = paramete r s  of models  (2)  a n d  (3), 
respectively, 
vjt, wjt = r e s idua l s  of models  (2)  a n d  (31, 
respectively, and other variables are a s  
defined above. 
As explained above, all variables are  computed over two 
observation window lengths: one year and two years. When the 
two-year observation window is adopted, the mean over two 
years for each variable is computed around the year of audit 
switch. 
Sample observations a re  partitioned into four portfolios 
depending upon the type of audit switch: B-B, N-B, B-N, and N- 
N. (B-B, N-B, B-N, and N-N represent a n  audit switch from BIG 
to BIG, NONBIG to BIG, BIG to NONBIG, and  NONBIG to 
NONBIG, respectively.) Since the group of B-N is too small (six 
observations) to have stable empirical inference, this group is 
removed from the multiple regression analysis. The groups of B- 
B and N-N represent firms that switch their auditors within the 
same class. Accordingly, if the N-B group (in which firms switch 
their auditors from NONBIG to BIG) exhibits different magni- 
tudes of earnings forecast errors and dispersions of earnings 
forecasts from those of the other two groups (B-B and N-N), then 
this paper can provide empirical evidence that a change in the 
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class of auditors affects security analysts in issuing their 
earnings forecasts. As a result, the first hypothesis is tested 
based on the significance of a dummy variable that is included 
in each equation. It is expected that b l  (cl) be negative and 
statistically significant. 
3.2 Audit Quality and Stock Market Reaction 
A traditional earnings-returns model is employed to test the 
second hypothesis of whether an audit switch affects the associ- 
ation between earnings and stock returns over a long observa- 
tion window (one year). Since the quality of financial statements 
is more likely to be reflected in stock prices over a prolonged 
period, the long observation window is preferred to the short 
observation window (one or two days around earnings announce- 
ments). The earnings-returns model requires an estimation of 
proxies for unexpected market returns and unexpected earnings. 
It is common in information-content studies to com-pute market- 
adjusted returns (MARTN) as  a proxy for unexpect-ed returns 
(Bowen, Johnson, Shevlin, and Shores, 1989; Biddle, Seow, and 
Siegel, 1995). MARTN is estimated as foll~ws.'~) 
M 
MARTNjt = (1 + RTN jm - MRTN, ) 
m=-11 
where 
MARTNj, = market-adjusted returns for firm i in year t, 
RT?,, = monthly stock returns for firm j in the mth month 
of year t, and 
MRTN,, = equally-weighted market-wide returns in the mth 
month of year t. "I 
A simple random walk model is employed to describe how 
10) Collins and Kothari (1989) indicate that the choice of observation window 
affects the earnings-returns relationship. Thus, we also compute an  
additional measure of compound market-adjusted returns over twelve 
months, up to three months after the end of fiscal year. However, there is no 
substantial difference in results between these two ways of measurement. 
11) When value-weighted market-wide returns are employed, the result is almost 
the same. Accordingly, this study reports the results based on equally- 
weighted market-wide returns only. 
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annual accounting earnings are generated. Unexpected earnings 
(UE) are then determined by subtracting expected earnings (i.e., 
EPS in the previous year) from actual EPS, both of which are 
reported in the I/B/E/S database. It is a common practice to 
use stock price and expected earnings to remove the size effect 
in measuring unexpected earnings. However, since the ratio of 
earnings to price is  not constant from firm to firm, the 
measurement of unexpected earnings can be affected by the 
cross-sectional difference in the capitalization ratio. Thus, the 
change in EPS is deflated by accounting earnings as follows. 12) 
U E .  = Ajt - Ajt-1 
J t  
Ajt-1 
where 
UE,., = earnings - deflated unexpected earnings for firm j, year 
t, and 
Aj, = actual EPS for firm j, year t. 
According to prior studies,  the  relationship between 
unexpected earnings and stock returns is moderated by some 
systematic changes in a firm's attributes. 13) Therefore, this study 
includes the annual sales growth rate (GRW and the natural log 
of a firm's market value (SIZE) as  moderating variables in 
estimating the association between stock returns and earnings. 
where 
D = a dummy variable which has a value of 1 for firm j in the 
post-switch period, and a value of 0 in the pre-switch 
period, 
12) We also applied stock price as a deflator in Equation (5). The empirical 
results were similar to (a little weaker than) those in the case where 
accounting earnings was applied as a deflator. Accordingly, we only report 
the results based on the accounting earnings deflator. 
13) Factors which moderate earnings response coefficients include: earnings 
persistence (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987). firm size, risk and growth (Collins 
and Kothari, 1989; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). However, for simplicity, 
this study only includes firm size and sales growth as control variables. 
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wjt = residuals of the model, and 
other variables are as defined above. 
Equation (6) includes a dummy variable to estimate the shift 
in coefficient on UE from the pre- to the post-switch period. 
Equation (6) is individually tested for each sample group. As 
proposed in the above, second hypothesis, investors reflect, in 
their investment decisions, the information of financial 
statements that are audited by BIG in a different way than the 
information of financial statements audited by NONBIG. This 
paper expects q, to be positive and statistically significant for the 
N-B group, as the quality of financial statements is enhanced by 
the audit switch. 
4. Samples 
The Compustat Annual tape includes information on auditor 
switches, Item 149. This item's code consists of two parts: the 
first part identifies the auditing firm and the second part codes 
for audit opinion. The first part ranges from 0 to 27: unaudited 
financial statements are recorded as  0;  financial statements 
audited by Big-Eight audi tors  a re  coded from 1 to 8, 
respectively; financial statements audited by other auditors are 
coded from 9 to 27, depending upon the name of the auditor. 
A change in the first part of Item 149 represents an auditor 
switch in a given year. The 1995 Compustat P-S-T Industrial 
tape shows that 1,317 firms have switched their auditors over 
the twenty-year period covered by this tape.14) When a firm 
switches its auditor over two consecutive years, it is not easy to 
distinguish the effects of two different types of audit switches on 
financial statements. Accordingly, the number of sample firms is 
reduced to 1,259 by removing 58 firm-year observations. 
Since empirical testing is done based on two different sets of 
observation windows: one-year and two-year; two sets of firm- 
year observations are prepared. For the one-year observation 
window (the two-year observation window), sample firms need to 
14) Name changes of audit firms owing to merging activities are not regarded as 
auditor switches in this paper. 
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report accounting variables in one year (over two years) 
preceding the audit switch a s  well a s  one year (two years) 
following the audit switch. These accounting variables include 
sales (Computstat Item 12) and price (Compustat Item 24). This 
process results in 951 (864) firm-year observations for the one- 
year observation (two-year observation) window. 
The I/B/E/S History tape reports the mean and standard 
deviation of earnings forecasts that are collected from security 
analysts every month. The observations selected from the Com- 
pustat tape need to have at least three security analysts who 
issue earnings forecasts in the month immediately prior to the 
date of earnings announcement in order to generate meaningful 
statistics for the dispersion of earnings forecasts. Consequently, 
there are 304 (241) firm-year observations for the one-year (two- 
year) observation window after matching the above-selected 
firm-year observations with firms available from the I/B/E/S 
History tape. The final screening process is done by eliminating 
firm-year observations whose monthly stock returns are not 
reported on the CRSP tape. The number of sample firms is 
reduced to 214 (166) for the one-year (two-year) observation 
window by eliminating 90 (75) firm-year observations whose 
market returns are not available on the CRSP tape. 
The two sets of sample firms are partitioned into four groups: 
B-B, N-B, B-N, and N-N, respectively. Regarding the one-year- 
observation window, there are 160, 35, 6 and 13 firm-year ob- 
servations for B-B, N-B, B-N and N-N, respectively; regarding the 
two-year observation window, there are 119, 34, 4 and 9 firm- 
year observations for B-B, N-B, B-N and N-N, respectively. The 
B-N group is deleted for the further analyses because of its small 
sample size. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Earnings Forecast Errors and the Dispersion of Earnings 
Forecasts 
Panel I in Table 1 shows changes in: absolute earnings 
forecast errors ( I FE I ), standard deviations of earnings forecasts 
(STD), range (RANGE), numbers of security analysts following the 
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Table 1. Means of Changes in Earnings Forecast Errors. Dispersion 
and Other Variables around the Year of Audit Switch (t-statistic) 
Panel I: Means of Changes in Variables between Pre- and Post- 
Switch Periods Based on the Sample of the One-Year-Observation 
Window 
Type Obs A1 FEl ASTD ARANGE AN0  AGRW ASIZE 
B-B 160 -.002 -.004 -.008 .018 -.I10 .078 
(-.24) (-1.25)* (-1.32)* (.61) (-3.99)*** (2.07)** 
N-B 35 -.043 .005 -.015 .045 .002 .247 
(-1.65)* (1.81)* (-1.04) (.70) 1.04) (2.50)** 
N-N 13 -.036 -.007 -.032 .162 -.039 ,281 
(-.93) (-.87) (-.96) (1.93)* (-.33) (6.00)*** 
Panel 11: Means of Changes in Variables between Pre- and Post- 
Switch Periods Based on the Sample of the Two-Year-Observation 
Window 
Type Obs AlFEl ASTD ARAhJGE AN0 AGRW ASIZE 
- 
B-B 119 .039 -.OO2 .002 ,120 -.I58 .534 
(1.75)* (-.30) (. 10) (2.29)** (-4.43)*** (6.98)*** 
N-B 34 -.065 -.005 -.032 ,057 ,173 ,731 
( -181)  (-.66) (-1.70)* (.39) (1.56)* (4.15)*** 
N-N 9 .010 -.OOO -.002 .018 -.003 .150 
(1.07) - 1  (-.36) (.11) (-.04) (1.24) 
Notes: 
B-B = Group of firm-year observations that switch their auditors from BIG to BIG 
N-B = Group of firm-year observations that switch their auditors from 
NONBIG to BIG 
N-N = Group of firm-year observations that switch their auditors from 
NONBIG to NONBIG 
All values in each column represent means of changes between the pre- 
switch and post-switch periods of the variable in the heading. Each variable 
is measured as follows: 
Al FEl = changes in l FEl (absolute earnings forecast errors) from the 
pre- to the post-switch period for firm j,  year t, in which an 
audit switch is made: (= I FE I pstjt - I FE I p r e j J .  
ASTD = changes in STD from the pre- to the post-switch period for firm 
j. year t (= STDpostjt - STDp, j J  
ARANGE= changes in RANGE from the pre- to the post-switch period for 
firm j, year t (= RANGEpostjt - RANGEpre jt),  
AN0 = changes in numbers of security analysts followed from the pre- to 
the post-switch period for firm j, year t, (= (NOpostjt - NOprejt)/ 
- NOprejJ, 
AGRW = changes in GRW from the pre- to the post-switch period for firm 
j, year t (= GRWpstj t  - GRWprejJ,  
ASIZE = changes in SIZE from the pre- to the post-switch period for firm 
j, year t (= (SIZEPOStjt - SIZEp, 1 / SIZEP"j). and 
*, **, and ***: the change is significantly different rom 0 at the 0.1, .05, and 
.O1 levels, respectively, in one-tailed tests. 
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firm's status (NO), growth rate (GRW), and size (SIZE); between 
the pre-switch and post-switch periods, based on the sample of 
the one-year observation window. All three groups show a 
significant increase in firm size around the audit switch. After 
the audit switch, all three groups experience a decrease in 
earnings forecast errors, but such a decrease is statistically 
significant at the level of 0.1 only for the N-B group. Contrary to 
our expectations, the N-B group shows a significant increase in 
STD, which is inconsistent with the change (decrease) in I FE I . 
(Earnings forecast errors are supposed to be positively associ- 
ated with the dispersion of earnings forecasts.) 
Our conjecture regarding the significant increase in STD is 
that audit policy changes due to auditor changes may increase 
heterogeneity in analysts' earnings forecasts. Prior research 
suggests that certain factors underlying auditor changes, such 
as opinion shopping (Paully, 1984) and low balling (Eichenseher 
and Shields, 1983), are regarded by analysts as  undesirable 
switching incentives, particularly for switches within the same 
class (from BIG [NONBIG] to BIG [NONBIG]). 
Panel I1 in Table 1 shows changes in each variable based on 
the sample of the two-year observation window. The mean of 
each variable over two years preceding the auditor switch is 
computed and then compared with the mean of the same varia- 
ble over two years following the auditor switch. The N-B group 
shows decreases in l FEl and RANGE that are statistically signi- 
ficant at the 0.1 level; this supports the first alternative hypoth- 
esis. However, the B-B group shows a significant increase in 
l FEl after the auditor switch, which is similar to the results of 
Panel I. 
In sum, both sets of firm-year observations indicate that when 
a firm switches its auditor from NONBIG to BIG, security 
analysts are able to issue more accurate earnings forecasts. 
Also, the dispersion of earnings forecasts (which is measured as 
the difference between the highest and the lowest earnings 
forecasts) decreases as  a firm switches its auditor from NONBIG 
to BIG. However, when the dispersion of earnings forecasts is 
measured as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts, the 
results are contrary to our expectations. 
Table 2 shows the results of the regression model that in- 
cludes the moderating variables: changes in GRW, RANGE, and 
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Table 2. Multiple Regression Results: Changes in I FEI .  STD, and 
RANGE around the Audit Switch after Controlling over GRW, SIZE 
and NO (t-statistics) 
Panel I: Sample of the One-Year Observation Window (N = 208) 
Model INT D AGRW ASIZE AN0 $ F-stat. 
l FEl -.006 -.038 -.017 .022 -.lo1 .06 4.37*** 
(-.53) (-1.42)* (-.58) (.99) (-3.72)*** 
STD -.004 .010 -.002 -.002 -.004 .OO 1.16 
(-1.37)* (1.59)* ( - 3 1  (-.45) (-.73) 
RANGE -.011 -.004 -.010 -.007 -.025 .OO 1.07 
(-.63) (-.24) (-.56) (-.53) (-1.51)* 
Panel 11: Sample of the Two-Year Observation Window (N = 162) 
Model INT D AGRW ASlZE AN0 2 F-stat. 
l FEl .049 -.089 -.029 -.025 -.040 .04 2.68** 
(2.05)** (-1.95)** (-.73) (-1.14) (-1.37)* 
STD -.004 .007 -.027 -.007 .011 .04 2.61** 
(-.47) (.51) (-2.05)** (-1.07) (1.24) 
RANGE .001 -.008 -.059 -.023 .042 .02 1.82 
(.02) ( -  18) (-1.44)* (-1.09) (1.47)* 
Notes: 
INT = the intercept of the model, 
Djt = a dummy variable which has the value of 1 if firm j switches 
its auditor from a NONBIG to a BIG in year t; otherwise, the 
value is 0, 
A l FE l = changes in l FE l (absolute earnings forecast errors) from the 
pre- to the post-switch period for firm j, year t, in which an 
audit switch is made (= I FE I postjt - I FE I pre jt), 
ASTD = changes in STD from the pre- to the post-switch period for 
firm j, year t (= STDpostjt - STDprejt), 
ARANGE= changes in RANGE from the pre- to the post-switch period 
for firm j, year t (= RANGEpostjt - RANGEpre j J ,  
AGRW = changes in GRW from the pre- to the post-switch period for 
firm j, year t (= GRWpost ., - GRWprejt), 
ASZE = changes in SIZE from t t e  pre- to the post-switch period for 
firm j, year t (SIZEpost ., - SIZEprejJ, 
AN0 = changes in the nurnter of security analysts following the 
firm from the pre- to the post-switch period for firm j, year t, 
( = (Nopost jt - NOpreJt) /NOpre jt). and 
*, **, and ***: the change is significantly different from 0 at the 0.1, .05, 
and .O1 levels, respectively, in one-tailed tests. 
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NO. The regression model assumes that, after an auditor switch, 
the N-B group has greater changes in I FE I ,  STD, and SIZE than 
B-B and N-N. According to the table, even when changes in 
GRW, SIZE and NO around the auditor switch are controlled, 
there is a significant change in I FE I between N-B and the other 
two groups (B-B and N-N) based on the one-year observation 
window sample. More specifically, the N-B group has 0.038 more 
reduction in I FE I than the other two groups, which is statisti- 
cally significant at the 0.1 level. Contrary to our expectations, 
there is a significant increase in STD for the N-B group when 
changes in GRW, SIZE and NO around the auditor switch are 
controlled. 
When the regression model is tested based on the two-year 
observation window sample, the N-B group shows a greater 
decrease in l FEl than the other groups; this change is statisti- 
cally significant at the 0.05 level. However, there is no significant 
difference among N-B, B-B, and N-N groups in terms of the 
dispersion of earnings forecasts when changes in GRW, SIZE and 
NO are controlled. 
5.2 Earnings Response Coefficients 
In this section, the association between earnings and stock 
returns is estimated for each group of firm-year observations. As 
shown in Table 3, each group has four sets of firm-year observa- 
tions: PRE-SWITCH YEAR (POST-SWITCH YEAR) represents 
firm-year observations in year -1 and year -2 (year +1 and year 
+2) around the year of auditor switch, while ONE YEAR (TWO 
YEAR) observations are as defined above. 
As consistent with previous studies, all associations between 
earnings and stock returns are positive. 
Table 4 shows earnings-returns relations for each group by 
controlling over two moderating variables: GRW and SIZE. The 
change in earnings (UE) is deflated by expected accounting 
earnings. 
Let us  focus on the results for firms which switch their 
auditors from NONBIG to BIG (see N-B type change in the table). 
As expected, earnings-returns relationships are strengthened for 
both ONE YEAR and TWO YEAR windows. ERC (the coefficient 
on the dummy variable in the multiple regression model based 
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation between Market-Adjusted Annual 
Returns and Unexpected Changes in Earnings 
TYPE CLASS Corr. Coef. p-value OBS 
B-B PRE-SWITCH YEAR .166 (.OO)*** 282 
POST-SWITCH YEAR .009 (.87) 282 
ONE YEAR .I36 (.Ol)*** 320 
TWO YEAR .095 (.02)** 564 
N-B PRE-SWITCH YEAR .173 I. 15) 69 
POST-SWITCH YEAR .435 (.OO)*** 69 
ONE YEAR .270 (.02)** 70 
TWO YEAR .243 (.OO)*** 138 
N-N PRE-SWITCHYEAR .229 (.28) 24 
POST-SWITCH YEAR .392 (.05)** 24 
ONE YEAR .378 (.05)** 26 
TWO YEAR .366 (.,I)*** 48 
Notes: 
PRE-SWITCH YEAR = sample firm-year observations of two years 
before the audit switch, 
POST-SWITCH YEAR = sample firm-year observations of two years after 
the audit switch, 
ONEYEAR = sample firm-year observations of two years 
around the audit switch, 
TWO YEAR = sample firm-year observations of four years 
around the audit switch, 
UE = change in annual earnings deflated by earnings 
in the previous year, and 
OBS = number of firm observations. 
*, **, ,d ***.  the correlation coefficients are significantly different from 
0 at the 0.1, .05, and .O1 levels, respectively. 
on ONE YEAR of N-B) increases by 0.051 for the ONE YEAR 
window, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. When 
the observation window is expanded to two years around the 
year of auditor switch (TWO YEAR window of N-B), ERC 
increases by 0.053, which is significant at the 0.01 level. 
When firms switch their auditors from BIG to BIG (see type B- 
B in the table), investors have a tendency to reduce the 
usefulness of earnings in making investment decisions. The 
coefficient on the dummy variable in the multiple regression 
model based on ONE YEAR of B-B is 0.003 which is not 
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Table 4. Results of Multiple Regression-Unexpected Earnings Deflated by 
Accounting Earnings @-value) 
MART?, = q0 + q1 UEjt + q2PUEjt + q3GRWj;UEj, + q4SIzEj;UEj, + wjt (6) 
TYPE SAMPLE INT UE P U E  GRWUE SIZELUE R~ F-STAT. 
B-B ONEYEAR -.315 











TWO YEAR -.329 
(N = 138) (-4.13) 
-.376 
(-4.53) 




TWO YEAR -.587 




MARTN = market-adjusted return for firm j, year t; D: a dummy variable firm j 
for which has a value of 1 in the post-switch period and 0 in the pre- 
switch period; and other variables are as defined earlier. 
UE = changes in annual earnings deflated by earnings in the previous 
year, 
GRW = firm's growth measured as  a percentage change in sales growth for 
firm j, year t 
SIZE = the natural log of'a firm's market value for firm j, year t 
*, **, and ***: the correlation coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 
levels of . l ,  .05, and .0l, respectively, in one-tailed tests. 
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significant a t  the 0.10 level. However, when the observation 
window is expanded to two years around the year of auditor 
switch (see TWO YEAR of B-B), the coefficient on the dummy 
variable is -0.006 which is significant at the 0.10 level. 
The results on the group of firms which switch their auditors 
from NONBIG to NONBIG (see type N-N) are presented in the 
third part  of Table 4. The dummy variables do not show 
statistically significant coefficients for both ONE YEAR and TWO 
YEAR windows, even though they have positive signs. 
6. Conclusions 
In previous accounting literature, auditor size has  been 
adopted a s  a proxy for audit quality, which cannot be easily 
observed by users.  However, there ha s  been inadequate 
systematic, empirical investigation to support this conceptual 
assumption. If a higher quality of financial statements is able to 
communicate the economic performance of a firm to users in 
more objective and predictable ways, users would take such 
information into more consideration when making their 
investment-related decisions. 
This paper investigates how security analysts and investors 
react in different ways to financial statements audited by 
different classes of auditors. Since Big Six auditors have widely 
known brand names in the audit industry, auditors are divided 
into two classes: Big Six and non-Big Six auditors. As assumed 
in previous studies, if BIG are able to offer a higher quality of 
financial statements than NONBIG, this paper expects security 
analysts to have smaller earnings forecast errors and smaller 
dispersion of earnings forecasts, and also expects investors to 
incorporate more earnings information in evaluating a firm's 
value. 
When firms switch their auditors from NONBIG to BIG, both 
the error and dispersion of earnings forecasts issued by security 
analysts become smaller than those for firms which switch their 
auditor within the same class (from BIG [NONBIG] to BIG 
[NONBIG]). However, the improvement in the dispersion of 
earnings forecasts is not statistically significant when the testing 
model includes moderating variables such as changes in growth 
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rate, changes in firm size, and changes in the number of 
security analysts following the firm. 
Firms that switch their auditors from NONBIG to BIG show a 
significant increase in the magnitude of post-auditor-switch 
earnings response coefficients, compared to other groups of 
firms which switch their auditors within the same class. 
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